Student:Dayong Zhou
dayong_77@hotmail.com
The Collectivizationa and De-collectivization in Rural China
周大勇 (Zhou,Dayong)
Abstract: the process of de-collectivization took place 25 years ago, however it was uncompleted, which determined that china has to make great effort to continue his rural reform, in order to liberate the peasant and the status of rural region as the Party promised. In China, the non-privatization reform occurred along with the de-collectivization was a uncompleted reform, which remains the defects of both collectivization and small-scale peasant economy, therefore it restricts the development of the rural society, however, the current system seems unable also reluctantly to change it. This paper intents to introduce the process of the collectivization and the most important rural reform in this century, namely the de-collectivization, the demonstrates the progression of de-collectivization, its characters as well as the problems left to be solve.
Keywords: collectivization De-collectivization collective ownership incomplete
Foreword
I am pleased that I am allowed to write the term paper about China. China was influenced by Marxism and walked in detour of history for half century. Before Marxism bankrupted in former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries, China had adopted a different way to reform from those countries. Because of the difference in aspects of historical evolution, political forms and natural environment, it’s hard to compare the rural society of China with these former socialism countries directly, also, the progression of collectivization and its end are different in two continents.
Rural china before collectivization
Collectivization was a mark system of the socialist state. Although in the era of Utopian socialism, Robert Owen for example has already attempted to set up the collective farm, but it wasn’t pursued by force strength of government. Even the founder of communism Marx didn’t agree that communism could be realized in undeveloped countries with extremely poor productivity . It was Russia, the serf country, in which Communist took power without adequate preparation; collectivization was implemented by force, in order to consolidate the rule in grass-root countryside. This experience has influenced China and Eastern Europe, because one of the merits of the collectivization lies in being easy to be managed, the other lies in being easy to deprive peasants.
China was a backward country, which suffered from ignorance and war for centuries. Throughout the centuries some 80 to 90 percent of the Chinese population were farmers and live in one of some 900,000 villages, which have an average population of from 1,000 to 2,000 people. Villages were not self-contained, self-sufficient units. Clusters of villages centered on small market towns, which linked them to the wider economy and society by providing not only opportunities to buy and sell but also opportunities for entertainment, information, social life, and a host of specialized services. The traditional Chinese elite, often referred to in English as the gentry dispersed across the country and often lived in rural areas, where they were the dominant figures on the local scene, normally ruled villages. Although they held land, which they rented to tenant farmers, they neither possessed large estates like European nobles nor held hereditary titles. However, they traditionally interpreted central policies and national values for villagers. As in feudal relationship, the peasants and gentry live depend on each other. Gentry provided land to poor peasants and tenant, and work with rich and middle peasants to secure the order in village, for instance opening school and building basic infrastructures to maintain there social status. In Chinese history, at the beginning of very dynasty, the land relationship between landlord and poor peasants were comparably fair, that meant, peasant have parcel farmland to live on. But land tended to be concentrated on end every dynasty, then there might be a peasant uprising led to a new dynasty and retribution of land. This is the basic clue of social evolution in China before communist period.
After the Chinese Communist Party came into power in mainland, it had to keep its promise, which it made during the period of war to encourage the peasant to join the army, that it would gave peasant their own land. The first major action took place from 1940s to early 1950s. June 1950, a new Land Reform Law of new People’s Republic was promulgated and stipulated nullification of the feudal land ownership system, and institutionalization of the system of land ownership by peasants, in which the Party sent agents to every village to carry out the land reform policy. This in itself was an unprecedented show of political power and the resolution of transform an old society. The reform was successful, because the peasants supported the policy; most of them had been waiting for the reform for long time. In the light of the reform law, land were redistribute from the landlords, land-owning trusts or wealthier families to the poor segments in the same village; village elites, who might be expected to go up against the Party and its programs were brought down; new leadership was established by poor peasants who showed the most loyalty to the party's goals; instead of kinship group or patron-client ties, class status became new relationship among villagers.
the process of Collectivization
However, the Party’s leaders were not satisfied with the privatization of land, at one hand, such ownership, according to the doctrine of socialism, should have been abolished in the state of socialism, at another hand, private ownership of small peasantry had no function of property accumulation for the country. At that time, in order to accelerate the construction of socialism, China had launched The First Five-Year Plan after the Soviet model; heavy industry development was profound stressed since the leaders of Communist Party regard socialist country as a country with developed industry sectors. However, the situation in early 1950s was not ideal for a new country. Pressing of needs for food in a country with burgeoning population, domestic capital for investment, and purchase of Soviet-supplied technology, capital equipment, and military hardware. To satisfy these needs, collectivize agriculture was put forward. Collectivization was regard as a method to turn countryside to stabile backing, which can be managed as semi-military and had rare contact with outside, so that the government could press the price of agricultural products by means of scissors difference between cities and countryside, and seize huge numbers of profit from agriculture economies to support the industrialization in city. At the same time, the government had already nationalized banking, industry, and even trade. Private enterprise was already virtually abolished in national wide.
Despite internal disagreement as to the speed of collectivization, preliminary collectivization was launched since 1952. China's peasantry saw Chairman Mao and the Communist Party as heroic much more than Russia's peasantry had seen Stalin and the Bolsheviks as heroes, and through 1956 the peasantry cooperated with the Party. There was none of the resistance and warfare that had accompanied the collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union.
The collectivization of agriculture was basically completed with the establishment of the people's communes in 1958. The People’s Commune system was defined as a unity of politics and production, in which all members of the commune jointly owned property. Essentially, the commune system was based on private contract of its members and the principle of voluntaries and mutual benefit, however, it turned out yet as coercive institutional arrangement, which was made by government with political power. In the movement to achieve the People’ s Commune, peasants had no choice whether or not to join.
Communes were designed as large, embracing scores of villages created by combining some 20 or 30 advanced producers' cooperatives of 20,000 to 30,000 members on average, in some cases the membership varied from as few as 6,000 to over 40,000. It was instituted as an organization with functions of the lowest level of local government and the highest level of organization in agricultural production. Communes consisted of three organizational levels: the central commune administration; the production brigade , and the production team, which generally consisted of around thirty families. This kind of institution was an organization of hierarchies, in which the commune acted as political unit and top manager, the brigades played role of co-coordinators between the commune and the basic production teams. The production team was basic units of production and accounting. Since the people’s commune system was a tool established to extract resources from agriculture sector for industrialization, as a result, it neglected peasants’ incentive completely. In order to let the people’s commune system run, the central government designed an relative effective mechanism to encourage managers in each hierarchy to work enthusiastically, yet, in each level, the managers were treated differently and there was a clear difference in aspects of identity and welfare between the managers of the commune and of the brigades or production teams.
The commune was defined as administrative organ and executed the central government’s orders, and paid from central government’s budget, therefore the managers in the level of commune were “state cadres” , that means they were formal governmental officials and got wage monthly. These state cadres could be promoted and became officials of governmental divisions in higher level. Brigades and production teams were collective economic organizations, their running expenses came from production teams’ tribute. Managers in brigades level were called “collective cadres” . They were remunerated in their own production teams according to their labor quotas. Their wage was paid in the form of products instead of money. Managers in production teams were“team cadres”, they were also members of the production team. They worked as peasant like their workmates, and were paid in products according to labor quotas. Team cadres could be promoted to collective cadres. Collective and team cadres had little possibilities to be promoted and became members of state cadres. Nevertheless, as collective and team cadres had some privileges. For example, collective managers had the power of assigning state’s delivery quotas and production tasks among production teams, they determined who could enrolled in state-owned factories, universities and army. The production team managers executed the power of assigning work and distributing products among collective members. Furthermore, in the period of many political movements and class struggles, the identity of cadre could protect their families, relatives and themselves from being denounced and bullied (Tan, 1999).
At beginning, the commune itself was decorated as the representation of socialist society and had all merits of public ownership. Although nearly all the private property had been deprived, peasants had to praise the new system profusely. it was true, most poor peasants found that their lives changed, by eating in the public dining they didn’t need to worry about their own budget anymore, and by working together, they were not necessary to try their best. Following propaganda appeared in newspapers everyday:
The public dining halls are distributed in a way that members need walk only a few minutes from their homes to take their meals. On the freshly whitewashed walls of the one on Shihfuchien Street, a typical establishment, there is a big slogan in red, which reads, "High Spirits for Higher Production!" Its kitchen, to which the visitor is drawn by the aroma of food and the clatter of pots, is managed by Tu Hsiu-chen, the first volunteer cook, who has since learned large-scale catering from the chef at one of the city's restaurants.
The walls of the spacious dining room are decorated with paintings, as a home might be. Its tables and chairs, though simple, are scrubbed to a shining cleanliness. The food is fresh and tasty -- vegetables are grown by the commune itself. The staff make a special point of studying the diet and preferences of old people, children, nursing mothers and members with ailments. There is a separate room for parents with small children, provided with low tables for the little ones.( People’s Daily, 1958)
However, in practice, this ideal, extremely centralized form commune didn’t keep running well in most areas. Very soon it became clear that in most cases the communes were too clumsy to carry out successfully all the managerial and administrative functions that were assigned to them. The cooperative led to low-efficiency, the advantages of large-scale productivity didn’t arrive as peasants anticipated, productivity began to drop and discontent emerged. The reason lies in insufficient utilization of resources and lack of incentive of peasants. At one hand, the output of cooperation comes from all members’ work, in which the tribute of single household is difficult to be measured. So that opportunism like shirking happened naturally very frequently. An effective way to prevent shirking is to have all members supervised, but the seasonal work and spatial diversity of agricultural productive activities make it difficult to totally supervise. At the other hand, although brigade and production team cadres were obliged to complete state’s planning and all kinds of deliveries, the control right and residual claim of the people’s commune system were in the state’s hand, these cadres at grass-level could not design any reasonable incentive mechanism to encourage peasants to work hard and produce according to reasonable natural condition, such as soil, irrigation and farm year. The way left for brigade and team cadres was to punish peasants by struggling against them or maltreatment. But the brigade and team cadres also belonged to members of production teams, they and their families lived in the same community with their subordinates as well, so punishing peasants could also make themselves in trouble. Moreover, under the property rights structure of the commune system, the rest of output was not belong to the commune, brigade or even production team, but to the governments of higher level. This made the supervisors’ effort unrelated to any reward. As a result, even the supervisor himself has not enough incentive to work and shirk himself sometimes. In a word, under such conditions of poor supervision, in which all the work was distributed equally among all members at the lowest level--production team, shirking became every member’s rational choice and further weakening the efficiency of the system (Lin,1990).
De-collectivization
To prevent peasants from slow down, shrinking and escaping in work, and assure the system could keep on moving, the party collected all productive equipments and forbid members in people’s commune engaging in private production and business on the one hand, and at same time deprived peasants’ right of migrating from countryside to city or between districts by means of household registration on the other hand. Nevertheless, such policies had no effect on improving incentive of peasants, but they formed at least political press on very member of people’s commune, because it turned out that everyone’s only routine is to stay in the commune and finish one’s task. Without the right to leave or get better than others, peasants commonly chose to work with little effort, e.g. a passive method, to evade production tasks assigned by leader. Little accumulation and shirking made countryside widely fall into poverty , rare rural region had good conditions to develop industry or to improve commerce, infrastructures went worse, productivity sank quickly. The most serious crisis for agricultural collectivization happened between 1959 and 1961. GNP decreased from 213.8 billion Yuan in 1958 to 180.0 billion Yuan in 1962, with an average annual reduction of 15.1% in gross industrial production value and an average annual reduction of 19.3% in gross agricultural production value from 1958 to 1960. Owing to the serious shortage of food, a great famine took place in the whole country and at least 30 million residents died (Tan, 2000). Discontent with such system broke out, in some areas, peasants didn’t want to relied so heavily on orders from above and made so little allowance for local conditions or local initiative. The severe crisis forced the Party to adjust their policies. From 1961 on, commune functions were reduced to administration and co-ordination, production team was confirmed as the basic unit of accounting, certain production decision making was delegated to production teams, which were allowed to retain some income to overcome problems of egalitarianism; households again allowed to have small private plots and sidelines for planting vegetables, and a limited opening markets for transaction between urban and rural areas. However, these adjustments didn’t mean to change the system of people’s commune, but only to prevent peasants from rebel. From 1966 to 1976 China suffered the disaster of Cultural Revolution , there were large institutional swings took place in this period, in which co-operative moved from small to large and from team to brigade to commune again, local free markets, sidelines and private plots was prohibited again, and political factors had a great influence on production decisions.
In late 1970s, after the Leader Chairman Mao passed away, the requirement for improving agricultural productivity came alive. Administrators in provincial-level units with extensive regions of low yields and consequent low standards of living began experimenting with new forms of tenure and production. To avoid frontal conflicts of wide scope with government’s policies and the main ideology, a gradual approach was adopted. The first step of reform was to divide the production team into groups and to fix yield quotas for each group. Each group signed a contract with production team, the contractual items included the conditions of using land, laborers, farm tools and draft animals, the expenditure, labor contribution, rewards for excessive labor contribution and so on. After completing the tasks assigned by the production team, the output could be distributed among work groups according to their labor quotas. And then, the further solution was put forward, namely the typical form of fixing quotas called “all-round contract”, which was initiated by a few brave peasant secretly in Fengyang county of Anhui province. this contract regulated, household was allowed to cultivated a certain parcel farmland in the group, if grain quotas assigned by the state and the collective accumulation were accomplished, the household could own all the residual output. In the light of the contract, peasants were given directly stimulation to produce. The experiment was deemed successful and popular, and it soon spread to all districts.
At another side, political situation was appropriate with the reform form below. In the Eleventh National Party Congress, held August 12- 18, 1977 proclaimed the formal end of the Cultural Revolution, blamed it entirely on the Gang of Four , and reiterated that "the fundamental task of the party in the new historical period is to build China into a modern, powerful socialist country by the end of the twentieth century." The reformer Deng Xiaoping was elected as vice chairman and back to political stage and suggested a series of reform plans, though many contradictions still were apparent, change of policy was regarded as necessary. Rehabilitations of Deng's associates and others sympathetic to these reform plans were stepped up. Not only were some of those purged during the Cultural Revolution returned to power, but also individuals who had fallen from favor as early as the mid-1950s were rehabilitated. It was a time of increased political activism.
In November 1980, the Central Committee of Communist Party of China issued the document Some Issues of Further Reinforcing and Improving the Responsibility System in Agricultural Production. This article manifest the first time that the Party accepted the production responsibility systems developing in practice. In the document fixed output quotas of farmland for each group and responsibility contracts in some specialized obligations were indicated, at the same time, the fixed output quotas for household was also regarded as positive. Under the encouragement of government’s policy and related support measures, plenty of production responsibility systems developed very rapidly in rural areas. In 1981, a wide deeper reform called fixing the contribute quote for each household (bao gan dao hu), which was much more radical, was implemented. In accordance to the system, all collective lands in production teams were to be distributed among households based on their population or laborers. The households could manage the lands, made production decisions by themselves, and bore the results. When tasks assigned by upper government and the collective accumulation, e.g. a certain quantity of grain and livestock, were completed, the remained products could be owned by the households and not distributed among members in the production team. Moreover, if the household made sure that they have enough ration, they had right to sell the left grain to state owned agricultural enterprises or consume them as they want, usually feeding livestock or making wine for example. That meant the model from Fengyang was finally admitted by Party. In October 1983, the Party and the State Counsel issued the document Notice of Separating the Co-operative from Politics and Setting Up the Township Government and required the cooperative to separate from local government. The act ordered that the people's communes were replaced by administrative townships. By the end of 1984, 98% of production teams had taken the reform of Household Responsibility System. It was until then, the collectivization system was dismantled completely.
Some Characters of De-collectivization and Problems left
No restitution
Yet, de-collectivization and the implement of the household responsibility system is neither a reform of the ownership of land nor a process of privatization. As we have mentioned above, after the Communist Party set up its own government in 1949, it started land reform and distributed lands to the poor from landlords and rich peasants. Peasant acquired parcels of land according to the labor forces, then land were registered under name of each household. Before the eve of collectivization, most of lands in rural China were legally privately owned. But when de-collectivization began, peasants did not get back their former lands again. The household responsibility system only distribute the right of manage and benefit of lands among households according to their population or laborers. So, the de-collectivization in China did not like that in most of East European countries such as Bulgaria, Czech, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, but like that in Albania. That is to say, there was no restitution of land. However, in former East European Countries, whether restitution was implemented or not, the de-collectivization had symbiosis with privatization. In China, although during the process of de-collectivization there were in reality some opinions that lands should be restituted, such voices were not accepted, nor even discussed.
The reasons why restitution of land in the de-collectivization of rural China did not happen may lie in some historic reasons. First of all, although peasants in China had private ownership over lands before the collectivization, large percent of peasants owned farmlands that did not belong to them before, they obtain them from political transformation. Theoretically, violence can’t consist the legal reason of transfer of ownership over real estate, therefore even after the terrorize during the land reform at beginning of 1950s, the private ownership of lands, which was made out by the communist government, had not yet became stable and commonly accepted. However, the former landlord class had rooted off during the political movement, land contacts and register books of land title had been destroyed, no one dare to challenge the power of Communist Party anymore. Since the collectivization began soon after the land reform, the new established owner relationship was broken again, when de-collectivization came about, without supports from the central government, most of peasants only took the household responsibility system as another chance of equally distributing lands, just like the land reform in 1949. As to descendants of former landlord class, they might have not forgotten the experience of their poor ancestors’: claiming private right before the Party which regarding public ownership as universal truth is a dangerous deal.
Secondly, different from most country in former communist east European countries , in which farmers’ nominal ownership of lands was remained, even though their lands were requisitioned in collective farms without any payment, and so that it was easy for peasants in these countries to take back the land when the collective farms went over. On the contrary, in China, private ownership of land was totally abolished as soon as the people’s commune system was set up, after 20 years, the collective ownership had already fest basis. As a result, the transaction costs of restitution so high as to wipe it out. That means, even a peasant want to take back the former farmland which belonged to them, it’s very hard to him to collect the relevant evidences to support his claim, moreover, there was no legal justice process to support such application. So normal farmer would rather to accept the Household Responsibility System.
Finally, the key reason lies in the socialism system itself. Even though the Communist Party of had poor performance in leading the country and its people to wealth and happiness during socialist revolution, Chinese people have taken socialism as the characteristic of the country for grant, after all the slogan “ Socialism saved China” has been deeply impressed. So that even after the Culture Revolution, most people still propped up the Party. The Party led the rural reform and decided the de-collectivization. However, the reform is a “liberation of the rural productivity”, which suit the requirement of the Party. Because the Chinese Communist Party insisted that his mission is to realize socialism, and socialism is based on public ownership system. Collective ownership was deemed as one form of public ownership in rural regions, so that as China kept on the road of realizing socialism, “land in rural areas belong to collective” was certainly remained after rural reform, and regulated in the Constitution of 1982, which is valid till now.
At the time of de-collectivization, the dissolution of people’s commune and the wide implement of responsibility system were regard as a great innovation. According to the statistic, The Household Responsibility System did bring about a more prosperous agriculture in China. From 1978 to 1984, grain output in China increased at an annual average rate of 5% and the gross value of agriculture by 7.7% (Lin, 1997). In contrast with former European countries, the de-collectivization seems bring more benefit to Chinese peasants at beginning. So that at that time, rare peasant did realize that such a reform without transformation of ownership was incompletely. However, The natural shortcomings of the de-collectivization would surely bring a series of problems.
institutional problem: land distribution
As we showed above, the de-collectivization ran smoothly and the introduction of Household Responsibility System has got a great success, although it could not address everything as only an institutional innovation. After several years of practice, it has been already proved that there are a number of weaknesses and limitations remained from the incompletely de-collectivization. One has to confirm, that the collective ownership and contract system led to the inequity in both economic and political features.
In economic view, during the de-collectivization, farmland was distributed to individual households in form of fragmented farming units. The principle of land distribution was derived directly from collective ownership. Farmland in a village was owned by all of its members collectively. As a result, every member had equal right to claim on distribution of the land according to certain norm, which was based primarily on the size of the peasant family. In reality of China with abundant population and limited land, the amount can be distributed to each household was very small. Moreover, land differed from each other in terms of soil fertility, irrigation conditions, location and so on. In many cases, a household had to obtain pieces of land from each of the grades. as a result, the sum was not only insufficient but also disjointed and scattered around villages. Large areas of cultivated land were wasted in the form of paths and boundaries separating households' contract field. A survey conducted by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture indicated that in 1986, among 7983 sample villages from 29 provinces, average cultivated area per household was 0.466 ha (7 mu) fragmented into 5.85 plots, each plot on average 0.08 ha (1.2 mu) (Ministry of Agriculture of China, 1993) . This fragmented structure of family farming has remained largely untouched after implement of contract system and has detained the possibilities of using relatively advanced mechanical agricultural equipment and infrastructures.
Under such system, farmers turned to be short-term in action. According to the distribute rule of land in household responsibility system, land is to distribute depended only on villager status, babies and villagers' new-comer such as newly married bride from other villages were all eligible claimants, which having equal rights to share equal amounts of land in this village; on the contrary, when a villager left or died, the right of land claim would automatically withdraw. As population increased, villages had to readjust the distribution structure, which further subdivided the farmland . The endless redistribution of farmland resulted in many problems, including: 1) the situation of a small and fragmented farming structure further deteriorated; 2) worrying about the risk of losing their land as well as investment, farmers had little incentives to improve land conservation and agricultural infrastructure - irrigated land, one of the most significant components of agricultural infrastructure in China, remained almost unchanged during the 1980s; 3) farmers over-exploited the soil to pursue short-term profits; 4) the course of land redistribution was also costly, it required labor and time in organization and execution. (Chen, 1999)
Another problem is that farmland was generally badly endowed with the appropriate human capital. Since egalitarianism was the general leading principle rule, which gave little consideration to interfamily differences such as labor capability, education and individual preference . As a result, some large households with a incomplete labor force could have comparably much more land to cultivate, meanwhile other smaller households, above all those specialized in agriculture, could have only inadequate land for full employment. Such kind of problem was much worse in rural areas experiencing rapid township or village industry and urbanization. In those region there was often deterioration in the agricultural labor force since most of capable labors tended not to work at home as a farmer. There were many who did not give priority to cultivation and at times even let the land lie unused. Consequently, the farmland was underutilized .
Upon preceding analyzing, we can see that, in order to pursue egalitarianism on surface in distribution of land, in the process of the de-collectivization sacrificed economic efficiency. Thus, if the land was private, then those difference arouse from distribution will decease after enough time, because the free market will lead to equal efficiency through the choose of market. However, such political background lacked from beginning on, so that the shortcoming of a non-privatization de-collectivization can’t be corrected or even be enlarged because of problem of political system.
One of the main reason is political structure over the collective ownership. First at grass-root level, it was usually the village head, who takes the power to decide distribution since decentralization. So that the cadre family or their relations will surely benefit from the distribution. Having a cadre in the family seems to be a certain prerogative in using their political status to accumulate wealth. At one hand, Village cadres may allocate more fertile parts of the village land to themselves and determined more favorable grain sales quotas for themselves. And also, cadres have more opportunity to build personal relationship with higher level and other important departments, rural credit banks or transportation companies for example, so that they have more chance to obtain material benefit than normal peasants. As we see, most of collective enterprises and private economies in rural areas have tight relationship with local governments, at the basic level, with villager cadres, most rural enterprisers are villager leader themselves. Furthermore, cadres and their relations generally tend to break the policy of birth control, because they are capable to support more family members, and their kin will strengthen their economic and political power in return.
At another hand, though according to the election regulation of rural cadre in china, these village cadre should be elected directly by villagers, who have common interest in the community, this rule has been almost never put into practice. Under one Party system and public ownership system, all important resources are gathered in the Party’s hand, as a result, instead of election, the opinion from higher level plays a significant role, in order to carry ort the policy of Party efficiently. In fact, two factors determine the candidates in appointment of village head, one is the relationship with official of higher level, and the other is kinship. Consequently, cadre family takes all advantages to maintain their power and status through such appointment. So, cadres in rural China don’t represent the benefit of their village members, but the power of the Party as well as the family, there is no possibility for peasants to claim equality or save their from suffering as a peasant.
In a word, after a short flourish in rural China, which came along with the de-collectivization and the implement of Household Responsibility System, most peasants have to face the irrational occupation and distribution system of farmland and the political system, which is impossible to change. Besides there was strict limitation prevent peasants from abandoning their responsible land and rushing into cities, so that the peasants found it is hard to change their situation or turn it more better and free. This may explain why in rural china exists always the tendency of over population but the income of household began to decrease only after less than 10 years from the de-collectivization. As a result, land reform in China has emerged as a difficult issue in rural areas of exchange between social equality and economic efficiency. It seems obvious that since the mid-1980s the wide rural society has been caught in this predicament: where social equality or equity worsened, and at same time economic efficiency held back.. According to statistics, average net income in countryside has been slowed down for years. In 2000, the household average income only reached 272 dollars, but the Gini coefficient in China base in urban and rural areas rose from 0.21 in 1978 to more than 0. 46.
海南省邮政条例
海南省人大常委会
海南省人民代表大会常务委员会公告
第86号
《海南省邮政条例》已由海南省第四届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十六次会议于2011年11月30日通过，现予公布，自2012年1月1日起施行。
海南省人民代表大会常务委员会
2011年11月30日
海南省邮政条例
（2011年11月30日海南省第四届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十六次会议通过）
第一章 总 则
第一条 为保障邮政普遍服务，规范邮政市场秩序，保护邮政通信与信息安全，维护用户、邮政企业和快递企业的合法权益，促进邮政业健康发展，根据《中华人民共和国邮政法》等法律、行政法规的规定，结合本省实际，制定本条例。
第二条 省邮政管理部门负责本省行政区域内的邮政普遍服务和邮政市场的监督管理工作。
县级以上人民政府发展和改革、公安、国家安全、财政、国土、规划、建设、交通运输、商务、工商、税务、物价等部门应当依照各自职责，协同做好邮政监督管理工作。
第三条 邮政是国家重要的社会公用事业。邮政普遍服务是国家基本公共服务的重要组成部分。
省和市、县、自治县人民政府及其所属部门应当采取有效措施，在规划、建设、用地、财政、交通等方面给予必要的政策优惠，支持邮政企业提供邮政普遍服务，推进邮政物流服务农业、农村、农民的网络建设，扶持快递园区建设。
第四条 省人民政府应当将邮政事业纳入本省国民经济和社会发展规划，组织编制和实施邮政发展专项规划。邮政发展专项规划应当与土地利用总体规划、城乡规划衔接。
省邮政管理部门应当会同有关行政主管部门，根据邮政发展专项规划编制城乡邮政设施、快递园区布局和建设的规划和计划，并监督、检查规划和计划的执行情况。
市、县、自治县人民政府城乡规划部门编制控制性详细规划时，应当按照邮政普遍服务标准明确邮件处理场所、邮政营业场所等邮政设施的位置和规模。
农村地区提供邮政普遍服务的邮政设施建设应当纳入乡镇和村庄建设规划。
第五条 公民、法人和其他组织应当保护邮政设施，维护邮政通信安全和畅通，对破坏邮政设施和危害邮政安全的行为有权制止和向邮政管理、国家安全、公安等有关部门举报。
第二章 普遍服务
第六条 邮政企业应当按照国家和本省规定的服务标准和资费标准，对信件、单件重量不超过5千克的印刷品、单件重量不超过10千克的包裹的寄递以及邮政汇兑提供邮政普遍服务。
邮政企业应当按照国家规定办理机要通信、国家规定报刊的发行，以及义务兵平常信函、盲人读物和革命烈士遗物的免费寄递等特殊服务业务。
第七条 省邮政管理部门可以根据本省经济和社会发展实际，对交通不便的边远地区的邮政营业时间和投递频次、乡镇政府所在地以外农村地区的邮政营业时间和投递频次、本省行政区域范围内邮件互寄时限等方面制定地方标准，但地方标准不得低于国家标准。
第八条 省邮政管理部门负责制定地址要素与邮政编码组合的通用邮政地址格式标准，组织、指导邮政企业开发邮政地址系统信息库。
地名主管部门及相关部门应当在设置的街道名称牌和门牌上附注邮政编码；地名和门牌发生变更的，应当及时通知邮政企业。
邮政企业应当在邮政营业场所免费为用户提供邮政编码查询服务。
第九条 邮政企业应当按照国家规定的不同服务地区的主要人口聚集区平均服务半径或者服务人口的要求，设置提供邮政普遍服务的营业场所。提供邮政普遍服务的邮政营业场所应当办齐本条例第六条第一款规定的业务种类。
邮政企业设置、撤销邮政营业场所，应当事先书面告知省邮政管理部门；撤销提供邮政普遍服务的邮政营业场所，应当报经省邮政管理部门批准，并予以公告。
邮政企业将邮政自办营业场所改为代办营业场所，应当报经省邮政管理部门批准，并不得停办原来已经办理的邮政普遍服务业务。具体审批办法，由省邮政管理部门另行制定。
第十条 代办邮政企业专营业务的单位或者个人应当与邮政企业签订代办协议，执行邮政普遍服务的规定和资费、服务标准。
邮政企业应当加强对代办营业场所邮政普遍服务质量的管理，并对邮政普遍服务质量负责。
第十一条 邮政企业应当在营业场所显著位置设置 “中国邮政”标识，公示营业时间、业务范围、资费标准、服务标准、业务单据书写式样、邮件和汇款的查询及损失赔偿办法、关于禁止寄递或者限制寄递物品的规定，以及用户对其服务质量的投诉办法。
邮政企业应当在邮政信箱（筒）上标明开箱的频次和时间，并按照标明的频次和时间开启邮政信箱（筒）。
第十二条 用户交寄邮件，应当遵守禁止和限制寄递物品的相关规定，不得交寄、夹寄带爆炸性、易燃性、腐蚀性、放射性、毒害性、传染病病原体等危险物品以及法律、法规规定禁止寄递的其他物品。
用户交寄邮件应当符合国家规定的封装规格、书写格式，使用标准信封和符合规定的邮资凭证，正确书写收件人姓名、地址和邮政编码。
用户交寄邮件不符合国家规定的，邮政企业不予收寄；已投入邮政信箱（筒）的，由邮政企业退回寄件人；无法退回寄件人的，按无着邮件处理。
第十三条 邮政企业应当依法建立并执行邮件收寄验视制度，发现邮件内夹带禁止寄递或者限制寄递物品的，应当按照国家有关规定处理。
邮政企业应当制定突发事件应急预案，建立突发事件应急机制。发生重大服务阻断时，邮政企业应当及时向当地人民政府和省邮政管理部门报告并配合做好应急救援和处置工作。
发生公共卫生事件、自然灾害等重大突发事件的，经省人民政府同意，由省邮政管理部门报请国务院邮政管理部门发布禁止寄递、限制寄递物品的通告。
第十四条 新设立的企业、事业单位或者新建居民住宅区，应当由单位或者住宅小区管理单位到当地邮政企业或者分支机构办理邮件投递登记手续；不办理邮件投递登记手续的，邮政企业应通知单位限期办理。邮政企业应当公布登记地点和电话号码。
单位更改名称、收件人变更地址，应当事先通知当地邮政企业或者分支机构，也可以办理邮件改寄新址手续。
具备下列按址投递条件的，邮政企业应当自办理邮件投递登记手续之日起7日内安排投递：
（一）有地名管理部门统一编制的门牌号码；
（二）有确定的用户名称和固定地址；
（三）已设置接收邮件的信报箱或者接收邮件的场所；
（四）具备邮政车辆和邮政从业人员的通行条件；
（五）按规定需要办理中外文名称登记的，已办妥手续。
不具备按址投递条件的用户，可与邮政企业协商，由邮政企业将邮件投递到双方商定的接收邮件的场所。邮政企业可以根据单位和个人的需求，在营业、投递场所设置用户租用的邮政专用信箱。
第十五条 邮政企业应当按照国家规定的投递频次和深度投递邮件，采取按址投递、用户领取或者与用户协商的其他方式投递邮件。邮政从业人员为用户提供到户服务时应当佩戴邮政专用标识和工号牌。
收件地址为单位地址的邮件，应当投递到单位设在地面层的收发室或者其他接收邮件的场所。收件地址为住宅，设有信报箱的，应当投递到信报箱；没有信报箱的，可投交收发（传达）室或物业服务管理机构的办公场所；没有设信报箱、收发（传达）室和物业服务管理机构的，可投递到与用户协商的指定位置。
乡镇人民政府所在地邮件投递深度等同于城市投递深度。其他农村地区邮件应当投递到村邮站、村（居）民委员会或者其他接收邮件的场所。
第十六条 机关、团体、企业事业单位和住宅区物业服务企业应当为邮政企业投递邮件提供便利，在楼房地面层或者物业管理区域主出入口处设置收发室、信报箱或者指定其他接收邮件的场所，准许邮递人员及车辆进入管理区域为用户提供邮政普遍服务，并免收停车费。
收发室、物业服务企业、村邮站、村委会或者其他接收邮件场所应有人员接收邮件。接收邮件的人员应当当面核对、签收，并妥善保管和及时传递邮件。发现错投和无法投递的邮件，应当批注原因并及时通知邮政企业收回。
任何人不得私拆、隐匿、毁弃、盗窃他人的邮件或者撕揭邮票。
第十七条 邮政企业在寄递处理邮件过程中，发生丢失、损毁、内件短少，或者邮件收发人员和邮件代收人造成给据邮件丢失、损毁或者内件短少的，应当依照邮政法律、法规的规定，采取补救措施或者予以赔偿。
承运邮件的铁路、公路、民航等运输单位在保管或者运输途中，发生邮件丢失、损毁、内件短少的，除邮件本身原因或者不可抗力外，承运单位应当依照法律规定或者合同约定承担赔偿责任。
第十八条 邮政企业及其从业人员不得有下列行为：
（一）冒领用户邮件、汇款；
（二）强迫用户使用高资费业务或者购买指定物品；
（三）擅自改变资费标准或者增加收费项目;
（四）不履行已公开作出的承诺或者进行虚假宣传;
（五）刁难用户或者对投诉用户进行打击报复；
（六）故意延误邮件传递时间；
（七）拒绝办理依法应当办理的邮政业务；
（八）违法提供用户使用邮政业务的信息资料；
（九）利用带有邮政专用标志的车辆从事邮件运递以外的经营性活动，或者转让、出租、出借带有邮政专用标志的车辆；
（十）转让、出借、出租邮政日戳、邮资机、邮袋、邮政业务单据、邮政夹钳等邮政专用品，或者用于其他用途；
（十一）法律、法规禁止的其他行为。
第十九条 邮政企业应当建立和完善邮政普遍服务质量自查机制，并定期将自查结果报送邮政管理部门。邮政管理部门应当组织对邮政普遍服务质量进行评价，并将质量评价情况向社会公布。
邮政企业应当公布服务、监督电话，提供查询服务，接受用户对邮政服务质量的监督。
对用户的投诉，邮政企业应当自接到投诉之日起20个工作日内将处理结果答复用户。用户对处理结果不满意或者邮政企业在规定期限内不答复的，可以向邮政管理部门申诉；邮政管理部门应当自接到申诉之日起20个工作日内将处理结果答复用户。
第三章 保障措施
第二十条 国家给予邮政企业用于邮政普遍服务和特殊服务的补贴资金，邮政企业应当将其使用计划报送省财政部门、省邮政管理部门备案，并接受省财政、审计和邮政管理部门的监督。
第二十一条 县级以上人民政府对承担邮政普遍服务义务的邮政企业，应当给予必要的财力、物力扶持和其他政策优惠。
财政、发展和改革、审计、邮政管理等相关部门应当加强对资金使用情况的监督。
第二十二条 县级以上人民政府应当按照基本公共服务均等化的要求，扶持农村地区的邮政设施建设，加强对村邮站的投入和建设，提高农村邮政普遍服务水平。
村邮站的场所和人员由村民委员会确定。县级以上人民政府应当对村邮站的运营和人员给予适当补助。
邮政企业应当支持或者配合村民委员会在农村地区逐步设置村邮站或者其他接收邮件的场所，并与村邮站签订邮件接收、转投协议，由村邮站负责邮件的接收和妥投。村邮站代办其他邮政业务的，邮政企业应当按照规定支付代办人员酬金。
第二十三条 建设城市新区、开发区、高校区、旅游度假区、工业园区、城镇社区或者旧城区改造，应当同时配套安排邮政普遍服务的邮政营业场所和邮件处理场所，具体位置和面积由有关部门与邮政企业协商确定。
重点旅游景区景点，较大的车站、机场、港口、高等院校和宾馆等地点，应当设置提供邮政普遍服务的邮政营业场所。
第二十四条 邮政企业提供邮政普遍服务的邮政设施用地，符合划拨条件的，由市、县、自治县人民政府依法划拨，免征城市基础设施配套费。
邮政企业已取得的邮政设施用地，未经依法批准，不得擅自改变土地用途。
第二十五条 邮政企业应当按照城乡建设规划在城市街道、广场、公园、旅游景区景点等公共场所设置邮政信箱（筒）、报刊亭等邮政设施，经当地人民政府批准后，免缴城市道路占用费等费用。
第二十六条 任何单位和个人不得擅自拆除、迁移邮政设施。 因城市建设需要征收邮政营业场所或者邮件处理场所的，应当事先与当地邮政企业协商，在保证邮政通信正常进行的情况下，按照就近安置、方便用邮的原则，作出妥善安排。
第二十七条 新建、改建、扩建的住宅区、居民住宅楼，建设单位应当在便于投递的位置设置信报箱。信报箱的建设应当纳入建设工程统一规划，并与主体工程同步设计、同步施工、同步验收，所需费用纳入建设成本。
本条例实施前已建成并投入使用的城镇居民住宅楼未设置信报箱的，产权人或者其委托的物业服务企业应当补建。已破损的信报箱，产权人或者其委托的物业服务企业应当及时维修或者更新。信报箱的补建、维修和更新纳入住宅专项维修资金的使用范围。
鼓励利用社会资金设置、维修和更新信报箱。
第二十八条 民航、海运、公路、铁路等运输企业对提供邮政普遍服务的邮政企业交运的邮件，应当保证邮件安全，优先安排运输，并在运费方面给予优惠。
机场、港口、车站应当妥善安排邮件装卸的固定场所和出入通道 。
第二十九条 邮政企业运递邮件的专用车辆报省邮政管理部门核定后，按照规定喷涂邮政专用标志色和邮政专用标识，由省人民政府决定减收或者免收柴油车车辆通行附加费。
带有邮政专用标志的车辆和执行投递任务的邮政从业人员通过渡口、检查站时，有关方面应当优先放行。
带有邮政专用标志的车辆，确需通过禁行路段或者在禁止停车的地点停车的，经公安机关交通管理部门同意，在不影响交通安全的前提下，可以通行或者停车；在运递邮件过程中发生轻微交通事故时，交通民警应当适用简易程序处理后优先放行；发生重大交通事故不能当场放行的，交通民警应当及时通知邮政企业，协助现场保护邮件安全和转运邮件。
禁止任何单位或者个人非法检查、截留邮件，或者非法检查、扣押、拦截带有邮政专用标志的车辆。
第三十条 任何单位和个人不得有下列行为:
（一）擅自拆除、迁移、损毁邮政信箱（筒）、邮政报刊亭、信报箱等邮政设施；
（二）私自开启、封闭邮政信箱（筒）或者向邮政信箱（筒）内投放易燃、易爆、腐蚀、带有毒性病菌等危险性物品或者其他杂物；
（三）在邮政营业场所门前通道或者邮政信箱（筒）、邮政报刊亭、信报箱等邮政设施周围设摊、堆物；
（四）法律、法规禁止的其他行为。
第四章 市场管理
第三十一条 在本省行政区域内经营快递业务，应当依法取得快递业务经营许可。
快递企业设立分支机构的，应当自取得营业执照之日起30日内向邮政管理部门办理备案手续；撤销分支机构的，应当书面告知邮政管理部门。
已取得快递业务经营许可的企业，应当在取得快递业务经营许可证之日起6个月内开办快递业务，超过时限未开业的，由颁证机关收回快递业务经营许可证。
中止或者终止办理快递业务的，应当提前15日书面告知邮政管理部门，在营业场所及本省主要媒体和政府网站上公告，并按照有关规定妥善处理未投递的快件。
第三十二条 以商业特许经营方式经营快递业务的，特许人与被特许人应当以书面形式订立特许经营合同。被特许人应当依法取得快递业务经营许可证方可经营。
第三十三条 快递企业应当按照《快递业务经营许可证》的许可范围和有效期限经营快递业务，并按照国家规定的快递服务标准向用户提供快递服务。
快递企业不得将快递业务交由未取得快递经营许可的企业或者个人经营。
快递企业应当对从业人员进行职业技能培训和职业道德教育，规范其从业行为。快递从业人员收派快件时，应当佩证上岗。
本条例第十三条、第十九条第二、三款关于邮政企业及其从业人员的规定，适用于快递企业及其从业人员。
第三十四条 快递企业应当加强快递服务网络的建设和管理，保障快递服务网络的安全和畅通，接受邮政管理部门、国家安全机关等相关部门的监督，并为其提供必要的工作条件。
第三十五条 快递企业接受网络销售、电视购物和邮购等经营者委托提供快递服务的，应当要求委托方提供经营资质，与其签订快递服务和安全保障协议，并报邮政管理部门备案。
第三十六条 快递企业应当在营业场所公示或者以其他方式向社会公布其服务种类、服务价格、营业时间、运递时限等服务承诺，并向省邮政管理部门备案。公开的服务承诺视为合同条款。
第三十七条 快递企业提供的快递运单应当符合《中华人民共和国合同法》关于合同格式条款的规定，在显著位置注明时限、保价及赔偿条款等保障用户权益的相关内容。
快递企业收取快件时，应当当面向用户告知运递时限、保价及赔偿等内容。
用户交寄物品应当遵守本条例第十二条第一款的规定并签字确认。
第三十八条 快递企业投递快件应当向快件收件人或者其委托的代收人当面送达，但是符合快递服务标准规定的自取情形除外。
快递业务员投递快件时，应当告知收件人或者其委托的代收人当面验收快件。当事人对验收快件有约定的，从其约定。
第三十九条 快递企业运递快件的专用车辆报省邮政管理部门核定后，按照规定喷涂快递企业专用标志。
带有快递专用标志的车辆在城区运递快件，确需通过禁行路段或者在禁止停车的地点停车的，经公安机关交通管理部门同意，在不影响交通安全的前提下，可以通行或者停车。
第四十条 快递企业及其从业人员不得实施下列行为：
（一）违反国家规定，收寄禁止寄递的物品，或者未按规定收寄限制寄递的物品；
（二）相互串通操纵市场价格，损害其他快递企业或者用户的合法权益；
（三）冒用他人名称、商标标识和企业标识，扰乱市场经营秩序；
（四）私自开拆、隐匿、毁弃、扣留、盗窃用户快件；
（五）违法泄露在从事快递服务过程中知悉的用户信息；
（六）法律、法规禁止的其他行为。
第四十一条 快递企业应当按照规定，妥善保存经营单据和电子信息，定期向省邮政管理部门提交统计报表、年度报告书等资料，并及时报告重大通信事故或者重大服务质量问题。
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